Voluntary Slavery & the Non-Aggression Principle
The purpose of this article is the question may a voluntary slave be forced to remain in slavery if their initial desire to be enslaved were to change? Before we delve into this paper let us first justify the importance of the topic and then offer reader a scenario. To the libertarian, the essence of all social order rests on the concept of property rights to which ownership of oneself is essential. Yet, what are the limits of bodily ownership? Does ownership end with the epidermis of your skin, or the tip of your hair shaft? What do you own, when you claim you own your body? What portions of your body, if any, may you abandon or trade? If you may trade off some portion of your body, may you trade all of it? It is the author’s opinion that many of the questions are embedded within the question of voluntary slavery. Yet, why would anyone wish to voluntarily enslave themselves? Let us call upon Blocks’ scenario.
“You are a rich man who has long desired to have me as a slave, to order about as you will, even to kill me for disobedience or on the basis of any other whim which may occur to you. My child has now fallen ill with a dread disease. Fortunately, there is a cure. Unfortunately, it will cost one million dollars, and I, a poor man, do not have such funds at my disposal. Fortunately, you are willing to pay me this amount if I sign myself over to you as a slave, which I am very willing to do since my child’s life is vastly more important to me than my own liberty, or even my own life.” Walter Block TOWARD A LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF INALIENABILITY: A CRITIQUE OF ROTHBARD, BARNETT, SMITH, KINSELLA, GORDON, AND EPSTEIN http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_3.pdf
Therefore, although other libertarians have condemned this topic as being miniscule within the broader scope of libertarian issues this author believes the question is still of importance.
Few libertarians would object, per se, to an adult committing themselves to the obedience of another adult for the infinitude of their lifetime given that most libertarians uphold the rights of individuals to make their own judgments. Although libertarians may not agree with such decisions, it is not within their privileges to prevent it. The conflict only surfaces when an individual decides that they no longer wish to be enslaved by another individual after formerly agreeing to it. Does the slave owner have any recourse? Objections to voluntary slavery take a couple different forms: promises are not binding; the “will” is not alienable and thus not contractible, it cannot be upheld without violating the non-aggression principle. Of the three reasons listed above we will only tackle the latter “it cannot be upheld without violating the non-aggression principle”. It is the authors opinion that if the last may be upheld the former two are deemed irrelevant.
Within any market for voluntary slavery it would be considered common knowledge that at some point in time the said voluntary slave may change his mind and decide to go back on any such original agreement. Thus, no would-be slave-owning company or individual would commit resources to acquiring such a slave without first asking what recourse do they have if/when the slave changes their mind. Clearly in a free society built on non aggression principle, no reputable court system would uphold any recourse that violated this principle. Yet, what does it mean to uphold the non-aggression principle in light of voluntary slavery, or better, what would it mean to violate it? For this I call upon a quote from a personal dialog with Stephan Kinsella
“Let’s be clear: to justify voluntary slavery means you have to justify the use of force by a would-be "master" against a would-be "slave", if the slave tries to run away or changes his mind or disobeys an order. The libertarian thinks use of violence against another person's body is unjustified aggression, unless it is (a) consented to, or (b) in response to aggression.”
Although I don’t particularly like this line of reasoning since it tends to implicitly hold rights to bodily-property above other tangible property as well as that the fact that I’m not convinced aggression, threat, intent, and proportionality should strictly be left to courts to establish. I will thus attempt to build my argument to fit within (b), that is, “the use of violence against another person's body is unjustified aggression, unless it is in response to aggression”.
Others would argue that the breaking of a promise is not, itself, aggressive. Thus, if a slave changes his mind about being a slave he has only engaged in changing his mind not, itself, an act of aggression. It may be true that directly changing ones mind is not aggressive, but I’m not sure we can say that it is cannot be within the chain of causality of an aggressive act. Let’s say you promise to hold a grenade without a pin, later only to change your mind and release it. Breaking promises may not be aggression, but surely you can’t deny the potential for aggression within this scenario.
Let me now attempt to pose some (of many) possible scenarios that could ensure an individual remains a voluntary slave without actually aggressing against the individual. Let us imagine a fenced in camp where individuals who agree to be volunteer slaves work. From here we may ask, if the slave doesn’t perform the duties asked of them must they still be fed. Who should enforce the feeding of this slave? If the slave attempts to leave, who must be forced to open the door? What if the door is sealed and cannot possibly be opened without tearing the walls down? What if the camp is not actually owned by the slave owner, but is instead rented? There is no need to carry on with the infinite amount scenarios that could be listed. Let us call these scenarios contingencies. These contingencies are built-in recourse for the slave owner. The volunteer slave is fully aware of these contingencies before the volunteer enslaves themselves. Clearly there is nothing aggressive about the existence of such camps or such contingencies. Maybe you could argue that they are immoral, but this is a matter of taste.
Once this, likely, scenario is built, it is the job of those in opposition to voluntary slavery to prove that some rights violation has been committed. To do this one must be willing to argue for the enforcement of positive obligations. Kinsella has argued this. If you push someone in the water you are under a positive obligation to save them or be charged with murder. But, I ask Kinsella this, where in our scenario listed above is the “push”? Where is the initial act of aggression that would require any positive obligation?
With this in mind, let me pose another possible remedy for the voluntary slavery argument. As mentioned above, the issue of voluntary slavery only becomes apparent when the slave no longer wishes to be a slave. Yet, how does this slave make such a decision apparent to the slave owner? They may stop following orders; they may attempt to run away, they may declare they no longer wish to be a slave. Yet, all of these scenarios could be accounted for in slave owners contingencies. Let us contemplate a slave contract with built in clauses that create a collection of double speak to which the slave agrees when voluntarily entering into a slave contract. Let us call this clause the, “yes means no clause”. When I declare I no longer wish to be a slave, I am only reaffirming my desire to be a slave. When I try to escape, I’m merely testing the potential for others to enter my compound. When I cease to follow orders, I’m actually asking to be motivated via a whip. We can understand why a slave owner would embed a complex version of the “yes means no clause” since it amounts to the equivalent of a loaded question. If the slave stops working, they wish to be motivated to work, otherwise they continue to work. Either way, the slave is working.
If such a concept is too nonsensical let us then imagine the infinite amount of other contingencies for the slave owner. Maybe the slave owner employees only guards who speak Russian, while the slaves speak English. Maybe the slave owner requires that all his slaves have their tongues removed via an initial voluntary operation so that they may not declare anything. Maybe the slave owner requires their slaves voluntarily chain themselves to a 200 pound ball so that they may not run away, etc, etc.
In all, within any 100% ownership society, any individual who owns no physical property to stand-on (like the volunteer slave) must, by definition, have another owner’s permission to even subsist. These individuals must exchange or persuade another land owner to allow them to trespass upon their land. Finally, like the bar owner who only allows individuals to sit at the bar if they are ordering drinks such land owners may require whatever they deem of these individuals.
In all, this paper was an attempt to bypass the arguments raised against volunteer slavery. It is the author’s opinion that if you may donate or sell a portion of your body, then you can donate or sell all of it, but this was not the purpose of the paper.
The purpose of this article is the question may a voluntary slave be forced to remain in slavery if their initial desire to be enslaved were to change? Before we delve into this paper let us first justify the importance of the topic and then offer reader a scenario. To the libertarian, the essence of all social order rests on the concept of property rights to which ownership of oneself is essential. Yet, what are the limits of bodily ownership? Does ownership end with the epidermis of your skin, or the tip of your hair shaft? What do you own, when you claim you own your body? What portions of your body, if any, may you abandon or trade? If you may trade off some portion of your body, may you trade all of it? It is the author’s opinion that many of the questions are embedded within the question of voluntary slavery. Yet, why would anyone wish to voluntarily enslave themselves? Let us call upon Blocks’ scenario.
“You are a rich man who has long desired to have me as a slave, to order about as you will, even to kill me for disobedience or on the basis of any other whim which may occur to you. My child has now fallen ill with a dread disease. Fortunately, there is a cure. Unfortunately, it will cost one million dollars, and I, a poor man, do not have such funds at my disposal. Fortunately, you are willing to pay me this amount if I sign myself over to you as a slave, which I am very willing to do since my child’s life is vastly more important to me than my own liberty, or even my own life.” Walter Block TOWARD A LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF INALIENABILITY: A CRITIQUE OF ROTHBARD, BARNETT, SMITH, KINSELLA, GORDON, AND EPSTEIN http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_3.pdf
Therefore, although other libertarians have condemned this topic as being miniscule within the broader scope of libertarian issues this author believes the question is still of importance.
Few libertarians would object, per se, to an adult committing themselves to the obedience of another adult for the infinitude of their lifetime given that most libertarians uphold the rights of individuals to make their own judgments. Although libertarians may not agree with such decisions, it is not within their privileges to prevent it. The conflict only surfaces when an individual decides that they no longer wish to be enslaved by another individual after formerly agreeing to it. Does the slave owner have any recourse? Objections to voluntary slavery take a couple different forms: promises are not binding; the “will” is not alienable and thus not contractible, it cannot be upheld without violating the non-aggression principle. Of the three reasons listed above we will only tackle the latter “it cannot be upheld without violating the non-aggression principle”. It is the authors opinion that if the last may be upheld the former two are deemed irrelevant.
Within any market for voluntary slavery it would be considered common knowledge that at some point in time the said voluntary slave may change his mind and decide to go back on any such original agreement. Thus, no would-be slave-owning company or individual would commit resources to acquiring such a slave without first asking what recourse do they have if/when the slave changes their mind. Clearly in a free society built on non aggression principle, no reputable court system would uphold any recourse that violated this principle. Yet, what does it mean to uphold the non-aggression principle in light of voluntary slavery, or better, what would it mean to violate it? For this I call upon a quote from a personal dialog with Stephan Kinsella
“Let’s be clear: to justify voluntary slavery means you have to justify the use of force by a would-be "master" against a would-be "slave", if the slave tries to run away or changes his mind or disobeys an order. The libertarian thinks use of violence against another person's body is unjustified aggression, unless it is (a) consented to, or (b) in response to aggression.”
Although I don’t particularly like this line of reasoning since it tends to implicitly hold rights to bodily-property above other tangible property as well as that the fact that I’m not convinced aggression, threat, intent, and proportionality should strictly be left to courts to establish. I will thus attempt to build my argument to fit within (b), that is, “the use of violence against another person's body is unjustified aggression, unless it is in response to aggression”.
Others would argue that the breaking of a promise is not, itself, aggressive. Thus, if a slave changes his mind about being a slave he has only engaged in changing his mind not, itself, an act of aggression. It may be true that directly changing ones mind is not aggressive, but I’m not sure we can say that it is cannot be within the chain of causality of an aggressive act. Let’s say you promise to hold a grenade without a pin, later only to change your mind and release it. Breaking promises may not be aggression, but surely you can’t deny the potential for aggression within this scenario.
Let me now attempt to pose some (of many) possible scenarios that could ensure an individual remains a voluntary slave without actually aggressing against the individual. Let us imagine a fenced in camp where individuals who agree to be volunteer slaves work. From here we may ask, if the slave doesn’t perform the duties asked of them must they still be fed. Who should enforce the feeding of this slave? If the slave attempts to leave, who must be forced to open the door? What if the door is sealed and cannot possibly be opened without tearing the walls down? What if the camp is not actually owned by the slave owner, but is instead rented? There is no need to carry on with the infinite amount scenarios that could be listed. Let us call these scenarios contingencies. These contingencies are built-in recourse for the slave owner. The volunteer slave is fully aware of these contingencies before the volunteer enslaves themselves. Clearly there is nothing aggressive about the existence of such camps or such contingencies. Maybe you could argue that they are immoral, but this is a matter of taste.
Once this, likely, scenario is built, it is the job of those in opposition to voluntary slavery to prove that some rights violation has been committed. To do this one must be willing to argue for the enforcement of positive obligations. Kinsella has argued this. If you push someone in the water you are under a positive obligation to save them or be charged with murder. But, I ask Kinsella this, where in our scenario listed above is the “push”? Where is the initial act of aggression that would require any positive obligation?
With this in mind, let me pose another possible remedy for the voluntary slavery argument. As mentioned above, the issue of voluntary slavery only becomes apparent when the slave no longer wishes to be a slave. Yet, how does this slave make such a decision apparent to the slave owner? They may stop following orders; they may attempt to run away, they may declare they no longer wish to be a slave. Yet, all of these scenarios could be accounted for in slave owners contingencies. Let us contemplate a slave contract with built in clauses that create a collection of double speak to which the slave agrees when voluntarily entering into a slave contract. Let us call this clause the, “yes means no clause”. When I declare I no longer wish to be a slave, I am only reaffirming my desire to be a slave. When I try to escape, I’m merely testing the potential for others to enter my compound. When I cease to follow orders, I’m actually asking to be motivated via a whip. We can understand why a slave owner would embed a complex version of the “yes means no clause” since it amounts to the equivalent of a loaded question. If the slave stops working, they wish to be motivated to work, otherwise they continue to work. Either way, the slave is working.
If such a concept is too nonsensical let us then imagine the infinite amount of other contingencies for the slave owner. Maybe the slave owner employees only guards who speak Russian, while the slaves speak English. Maybe the slave owner requires that all his slaves have their tongues removed via an initial voluntary operation so that they may not declare anything. Maybe the slave owner requires their slaves voluntarily chain themselves to a 200 pound ball so that they may not run away, etc, etc.
In all, within any 100% ownership society, any individual who owns no physical property to stand-on (like the volunteer slave) must, by definition, have another owner’s permission to even subsist. These individuals must exchange or persuade another land owner to allow them to trespass upon their land. Finally, like the bar owner who only allows individuals to sit at the bar if they are ordering drinks such land owners may require whatever they deem of these individuals.
In all, this paper was an attempt to bypass the arguments raised against volunteer slavery. It is the author’s opinion that if you may donate or sell a portion of your body, then you can donate or sell all of it, but this was not the purpose of the paper.
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